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Abstract: The aim of this paper is threefold. First, it addresses the question whether 
optimism about the instant productivity-boosting character of Industry 4.0 and 
digital transformation is justified. Second, by keeping in mind the potential pitfalls 
of such a production revolution, it looks at Hungary to see how it is progressing in 
terms of Industry 4.0 development and asks whether there are any the potential 
pitfalls to watch out for. Third, we outline the basic policy principles needed by the 
economic governance to support the sustainable emergence of Industry 4.0 and 
digital transformation. Our conclusion is that economic governance should take 
pro-active care of the evolving Industry 4.0 and digital economy in order to avoid 
increasing uncertainty.
Összefoglaló: Jelen írás első kérdése, hogy vajon kellően megalapozottak-e 
azok az optimista várakozások, miszerint a jelenleg is zajló negyedik ipari 
forradalom (Ipar 4.0) és a digitális transzformáció a termelékenységi ütem 
látványos és gyors (instant) javulását eredményezi. Vizsgálódásunk során olyan 
bizonytalansággal terhes folyamatokat fejtünk fel, amelyek különös óvatosságra 
intenek a termelékenységi hatást illetően. Második kérdésünk az, hogy miképp 
is halad Magyarország az Ipar 4.0 és a digitális transzformáció útján, illetve, 
hogy tükröződnek-e esetében is bizonyos bizonytalansági tényezők. Végezetül 
az előadottak alapján megállapítjuk, hogy a gazdasági kormányzásnak proaktív 
módon és az általunk fölvázolt alapelvek mentén érdemes felügyelnie az Ipar 4.0 és 
a digitális gazdaság kibontakozását.   
INTRODUCTION
In the era of hyper-globalisation, stimulating foreign trade and investment always aims to trigger productivity growth, hence contributing to sustained and inclusive economic development. However, since the mid-1970s the 
world economy has been pervaded by complex challenges, resulting in 
rather withering productivity growth1 in the developed world (e.g. both in 
the United States and the European Union). 
Under the domain of demographic challenge, beyond an ageing population 
and chronically increasing income and wealth inequalities, a shrinking 
middle class also signals a deteriorating entrepreneurial milieu in developed 
countries (e.g. the OECD). Meanwhile, it seems that the financial sector is 
getting less and less able to act as an efficient intermediator for the economy 
and resembles a financial casino, preferring greater return in a shorter 
1 For the so-called secular stagnation, see Gordon and Sayed (2019). The EU KLEMS database 
suggests that today’s productivity growth rates of are half of the value of two decades ago, and 
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time (e.g. the rising rate of share buybacks, excessive credit consumerism 
coupled with real wage stagnation, preferring larger and frontier companies at 
the expense of smaller laggards, declining labour shares of income while 
growing the capital share of income). The nature of emerging markets has 
also been changing. For instance, China is increasingly relying on services 
and internal consumption, accompanied by a conspicuous slowdown in 
economic growth. This has a significant impact on the rest of the world. Thus, 
Central and Eastern Europe should not remain Western Europe’s workbench 
any longer - i.e. the importance of labour costs is becoming obsolete due 
to the digitalisation of production, and reshoring (bringing back production 
and service provision that have been outsorced up until now) via Industry 
4.0 technologies and digitalised production has been gaining stronger 
momentum than ever. The sovereign debt crisis of 2008 has resulted in a 
persistent fall in private investment, stifling growth outlooks, which have 
been overshadowed by the ‘global trade war’. What is more, Europe is also 
losing the technology battle (there are no European companies among the top 
10 largest companies in the world).
This complex interplay of challenges calls for a governance capable of 
unleashing productivity growth to spur and strengthen trust in governance 
(i.e. sparking innovation dynamism by stimulating short as well as longer-
term sustainable investments over savings, lowering excessive risk aversion). 
And since more than two-thirds of productivity growth has always come 
from technological changes, the experts considering Industry 4.0 and the 
Digital Economy2 the boosterjet engine of productivity seem to be justified. 
However, the purpose of this article is to highlight the falsity of this 
productivity-enhancing narrative. In doing so, Section 2 addresses the 
question whether optimism about the instant productivity-boosting 
character of Industry 4.0 and digital transformation is justified. To this end, 
it uncovers the major potential pitfalls of this productivity-boosting ‘instant’ 
digital economy. Then Section 3 asks how Hungary is progressing through 
digitalisation and identifies some of the potential pitfalls of the spectacular 
productivity effect. Finally, by building on these insights, Section 4 outlines 
the basic principles of supporting the sustainable emergence of Industry 4.0 
and the Digital Economy.
2 Industry 4.0 refers to the creation of self-optimising cyber-physical systems based on various 
technologies (sensors, robotics, additive production, internet-based continuous communica-
tion and interaction (Internet of Things), simulation and virtual modelling, cloud-based services, 
augmented reality, data mining, artificial intelligence, and machine learning).
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INSTANT DIGITAL ECONOMY – 
NOT WITHOUT ITS PITFALLS
In contrast with the canon of mainstream economics3 about the impressive productivity-boosting character of Industry 4.0, we argue that the uncertainties looming around Industry 4.0 should tame our expectations concerning its 
impressive and instant productivity-boosting effect. 
•	 Security as part of the impossible trinity: Now it seems that safeguarding 
the trinity of security, privacy, and transparency is impossible (e.g. various 
cyber-attacks via open-source malwares attacking public services, 
ransomwares like WannaCry and Petya in 2017). Regarding IoT, there 
is a crucial need for secure and standardized connections, even in the 
case of 3D printers. Privacy is also a key issue, especially in the case of 
millions of Europeans whose data are in the hands of big US companies 
(e.g. Amazon). And once there is a broad feeling of a higher potential of 
interruptions, an insufficient demand pull arises; that is to say, the pace 
of the diffusion of Industry 4.0-related technologies suffers in spite of 
governmental measures tailored towards encouraging productivity-
enhancing investments in manufacturing. Notably, the lack of international 
regulation on investment in digitalisation can engender significant digital 
fragmentation across the board by limiting the productivity-boosting 
character of any kind of Industry 4.0 adoption (e.g. France, Germany, and 
Italy are to reach out additional protection from foreign investments in 
areas relevant to Industry 4.0).
•	 Paradoxical behaviours leading to uncertain policy results: On the one 
hand, states are increasingly forced to change course (i.e. overcoming 
dampening tax revenues from employment due to automation and 
robotization while maintaining the welfare state) and support productivity 
improvement through direct or indirect measures focusing on adaptation 
to Industry 4.0 and far-reaching digitalisation. At the same time, these 
support programmes can cause perceptible distortions by launching rent-
seeking and becoming ineffective (e.g. although in Shenzhen, China, only 
200 companies were specialised in robotics in 2014, by now this number 
is more than 2,000; in Nanking, 65% of the net profits of these companies 
came from state subsidies, without producing any competitive robots).
•	 Excessively liberating and stressing human resources: Of course, technology 
has always aimed at replacing human labour in one field, to be absorbed 
in another. However, this time seems to be different, since the scale of job 
replacement by automation/robotics is larger than ever before (e.g. 47 per 
cent of job tasks can be replaced by automation in the US, 54% in the EU, 
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and 77% in China). What is more, the picture is polarised: regions dominated 
by less-educated workers will be affected more by increasing automation, and 
regions characterised by a large tradable sector are more likely to be exposed 
to automation, since this is the way to bring new momentum to productivity 
growth.4 All in all, since jobless growth did not went into the oblivion in 
Europe and still a central issue, , Industry 4.0 will presumably aggravate the 
trend, unless sectors are able to absorb the workers elsewhere. In addition, 
technologies related to Industry 4.0 (automation, additive manufacturing) 
are very likely to lower the relative importance of input, hence diminishing 
goods trade, which in turn will affect employability. These forces are to be 
reckoned with in the case of investment-promotion measures. Furthermore, 
upskilling is ever-more difficult for workers who want to acquire better and 
higher positions in the current technological revolution, potentially leading 
to increasing unemployment, and thereby feeding into an increasing portion 
of corporate and household sectors with escalating debt. As for the effect 
of stress, the ‘Art of Living with ICT’ literature describes the mental aspect 
of the broadly applied ICT-based technologies (i.e. 24/7 availability creates 
a culture of anxiety via real-time data-based monitoring methods; people 
have to compete not only with people but also with machines, etc.).5 
•	 Institutional headwinds: Labour market institutions influence the 
performance of the innovation ecosystem (e.g. attracting multinationals 
to get a critical mass of foreign companies driving the diffusion of 
modern management techniques and offering a channel for smaller 
domestic companies to internationalise their operations on the back of 
the multinationals, etc.). The conventional wisdom in economics is that a 
more flexible labour market is better for innovation in any case, i.e. hiring 
creative and risk-taking new staff is cheaper under more flexible regulation, 
hence innovation speeds up. This results in higher productivity, potentially 
coupled with wage increases. However, the United States, with one of 
the most flexible labour markets, has been facing a rather sluggish wage 
growth for decades. In fact, fully adopting a US-like low-level employment 
protection to Europe would significantly lower the share of high-skilled and 
better educated workers within the total employment, at the expense of the 
low-skilled workers. Moreover, they are the ones with more sophisticated 
tasks, of which automation and robotization promise more savings for 
employers. Consequently, the principle of inclusive growth is violated, while 
4 The most innovative firms seem to attract more workers and create jobs with innovative up-to 
date capital.? 
5 Robots are becoming more skilful than humans by causing mental stress. ? Due to its demo-
graphic features (i.e. one in four Japanese people is over 65 years old), Japanese economic 
policy was decided to prioritise machine-human communication and work over machine-ma-
chine when supporting SME transformation. In addition, obtaining a higher level of social skills 
and emotional intelligence in the case of managers/leaders is a must in mastering the chal-
lenges of AI becoming ubiquitous ?.
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the shrinking tax revenues from employment calls for European welfare 
states to redefine their functions. All in all, expecting high productivity 
improvement from the deregulation of the EU labour markets in a one-size-
fits-all manner is wishful thinking.
A BIRD’S EYE VIEW 
OF THE HUNGARIAN PERSPECTIVE
Pitfalls of Digital Transformation
Hungary’s digital transformation, including its readiness for Industry 4.0, of course, does not seem to show great  progress yet (e.g. Hungary has been well below the EU average in terms of the Digital Economy and Society 
Index; out of 63 countries ranked by their digital competitiveness, Hungary was 
46th in the 2018 ranking, although it improved by three places in the 2019 ranking 
(see its strengths and weaknesses in Figure 1). 
Figure 1. 
Ranking in the IMD Digital Competitiveness Yearbook 2019 
(out of 63 countries)
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Since the quality of human capital is of key importance for enhancing productivity 
and thereby competitiveness (e.g. digital start-ups reach the phase of equity or 
venture financing sooner if they are equipped with people with higher technical 
and managerial education), the complex task of attracting, breeding, and retaining 
talent is de rigueur in contributing to the sustainable expansion of Hungarian 
companies and fertilising a productivity-enhancing investment milieu (e.g. 
Hungary’s productivity growth, in terms of GDP per hour worked, has been 
one of the most moderate ones among the Visegrád countries since 2010; 
Romania has exceeded the Hungarian performance since 2011).6 Promoting the 
foreign market entry of Hungarian firms (joining the international value chain and 
catching up with the frontrunners in terms of digital transformation and Industry 
4.0) is an absolute necessity (e.g. domestic firms have typically no capacity 
to invest in and import sector-specific machinery from abroad, but larger and 
mostly foreign-owned companies do).7
By reflecting on the above dimensions, which warn against high hopes 
concerning Industry 4.0 as the boosterjet engine of productivity, the following 
can be concluded for Hungary.
•	 Security-related uncertainty: The highly disruptive nature of modern digital 
technologies (platforms) triggers tensions, as demonstrated in 2015, 
when Hungarian taxi drivers rebelled against Uber. In addition, in early 2017, 
the Hungarian Hotel and Restaurant Association expressed concern over 
the ever-increasing use of Airbnb and provided a potential roadmap towards 
the ‘whitening’ of Airbnb-based businesses with the help of the government 
and the National Tax and Customs Administration. In addition, and despite the 
rising awareness of the crucial importance of cybersecurity (the new national 
cybersecurity strategy was accepted in January 2019), Hungary has not been 
able to avoid serious cyberattacks against public institutions (e.g. against 
hospitals during 2016 via ransomwares such as Locky and CryptoWall 4), 
whipping up concern over the vulnerability of Hungarian public services. CEE 
countries are still far behind their Western European peers, and Hungary is 
one of the jurisdictions with the highest number of cyber-attack incidents. It is 
hardly a coincidence that according to the survey of the Industry 4.0 National 
6 The fact that Hungary has only improved by three places in the ranking of the IMD World Com-
petitiveness Yearbook in the period 2013-2019, whereas Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Romania have 
shown skyrocketing increases, suggests that Hungary’s international competitiveness has 
structural weaknesses, yet to be addressed, such as breeding, mobilising, and utilising talent 
in a more vigorous way, which would feed into the foreign expansion of companies as well as 
attracting FDI to spark value-added productivity improvements (see IMD World Talent Ranking 
2018 and 2019 by implying a character of net exporter of talents). 
7 Beside the fact that foreign trade companies are significantly more productive than countries 
operating only within the Hungarian borders, and merely 5% of companies account for more 
than 80% of all exports and imports, foreign trade status plays a more important role in differ-
entiating among companies than ownership structure. The Hungarian business sector is to a 
large extent divided between more efficient foreign companies and domestic companies with 
mostly anaemic performance. 
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Technology Platform, only few companies have an Industry 4.0 strategy 
(13.3% of micro, 31.3% of small, 14.3% of medium-size, and 14.3% of large 
companies have a strategy), and 50% of the companies that responded had 
also not innovated in the previous five years in the area of digital transformation 
and Industry 4.0 development.
•	 Labour market and freeing up workforce: Although the strictness of Hungarian 
employment protection has been well below the OECD average, as discussed 
above, productivity and innovation performance have not improved as one 
would have previously thought. Still, the newest amendment of the Labour 
Act by the Hungarian Parliament in December 2018 became effective as of 
1 January 2019, introducing the so-called Overtime Act, with the possibility 
to raise overtime hours from 250hrs/year to 400hrs/year on a voluntary 
basis. This has made the Hungarian labour market regulation seemingly 
more flexible. As discussed earlier, seeking a more flexible labour market 
is not an elixir per se, and it potentially injects additional uncertainties into 
the socio-economic innovation ecosystem. Bearing in mind the constellation 
of an (I) intensifying shortage of (skilled) labour via brain drain (a status 
of net exporter of talent), coupled with (II) the increasing dependency of 
households on remittances from expatriate workers8, accompanied by (III) 
ever-heightening inequalities and impoverishment9, the recent changes in 
labour market legislation might unwittingly support a low-productivity growth 
environment.10 Although these forces act against an inclusive Industry 4.0, 
the positive impetus of such an orientation on productivity is doubtful (e.g. 
supporting companies to purchase Industry 4.0 technologies would be nothing 
more than giving them expensive toys without professional knowledge).
Shining lights in digital transformation
Many analysts emphasize that an Industry 4.0-based economic structure pervaded by an advanced level of digitalisation (replacing half of the workforce activities via automation) will add a minimum 
of half a percentage point to the GDP growth on a yearly basis up until the 
mid-2020s. Still, the Hungarian Industry 4.0 landscape is by no means without 
its potential pitfalls. 
8 Personal remittances received (in % of GDP) have been by far the greatest in Hungary among 
the Visegrád countries. They accounted for 2% of the GDP in 2010 and increased to 3.3% by 
2017, due to a significant number of people emigrating from the country. According to the 
Hungarian Central Statistical Office, almost 175,000 people have left Hungary since 2010. 
9 In 2016, among the Visegrád group only the Hungarian rate of risk of poverty or social exclusion 
exceeded the European Union average. Moreover, now it takes 7 generations for a child born in 
a poor family to get into the middle class.
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Summarising the major insights of recent surveys on the progress of Industry 
4.0 in Hungary:
•	 Hungary seems to have great potential for Industry 4.0 development, with 
the electronics and automotive industries digitalised the most so far (with a 
salient automation trend here to stay); 
•	 the application of Industry 4.0 related technologies has  positive impact mainly 
in the case of larger and medium-sized companies in terms of increasing 
added value; 
•	 to date, 60% of responding manufacturing companies in Hungary do not apply 
any smart manufacturing systems or solutions (the number of companies 
without a website is still substantial); 
•	 these companies are in great need of information and knowledge transfer, 
as well as concrete solutions regarding Industry 4.0 development (44% of 
respondents pinpointed both a lack of information and knowledge and the 
high costs of implementation as primary hurdles to progress);11 
•	 90% of responding firms operate only with a small R&D expenditure base, 
within the range of 0.1–3%; 
•	 while Hungarian respondents reported one of the highest levels of supply 
production information integration and customer production information 
integration compared to those in the other regions analysed (Upper Austria, 
Lower Bavaria, Veneto, Emilia Romagna, and Lower Silesia), this perception 
has not really been mirrored in terms of outcomes (i.e. Hungary is an 
average performer in production and process innovations, except for the 
mainly foreign-owned export sector; the domestic SME sector has low growth, 
productivity, and propensity to innovate); 
•	 most Hungarian manufacturing firms are predominantly expecting 
benefits from adopting Industry 4.0 solutions in terms of significant cost 
reductions, as well as time savings in reaching out to markets. Thus, neither 
productivity improvement nor large-scale job creation is considered an 
unambiguous goal. Keeping in mind the potential pitfalls, it is not surprising 
that a lack of skilled labour and adequate training, as well as widespread 
digital illiteracy was repeatedly reported as a major obstacle to establish 
Industry 4.0 development in Hungary.12 Consequently, the current state of 
affairs of manufacturing firms calls for more complex development and 
training programmes.
11 Furthermore, a recent survey was commissioned by the Industry 4.0 National Technology Plat-
form, with the aim of assessing the readiness as well as awareness by domestic manufactur-
ing companies of Industry 4.0. The survey revealed that both large companies and Hungar-
ian SMEs lack a systemic strategy for Industry 4.0 (66% of large companies surveyed do 
not have a strategy at all, with 36% in the case of SMEs).
12 Hungary belongs to the bottom third in terms of maturity among European countries, while 
Slovakia and the Czech Republic have outdone Hungary. In terms of digital competitive-
ness, Hungary seems to have been deteriorating (while it ranked 36th out of 63 countries in 
2014, it fell to the 46th place by 2018).
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Although the potential pitfalls related to Industry 4.0 and digitalisation are 
disquieting, Hungarian policy has started to zero in on both the necessary 
approach and some of the inhibiting factors. 
First, the Hungarian policy for foreign affairs and trade recognises that the 
promotion of the digital transformation and the diffusion of Industry 4.0 requires 
a more holistic approach. Supporting the necessary infrastructural investments 
is by no means a straightforward and sufficient approach, and its complexity 
must be addressed. The Hungarian foreign trade policy, mirrored in the National 
Export Strategy for 2019-2030, therefore addresses the digital transformation and 
the sustainable emergence of Industry 4.0 via a multifaceted policy approach: 
(I) by appreciating the presence of transnational companies bearing the torch of 
a transformation that requires higher frontload investment, and offering fertile 
grounds for local firms to learn and to join the process (the Strategy emphasises, the 
opportunities for setting up joint ventures with local partners based on technology 
and knowledge transfer); (II) promoting the integration of SMEs as suppliers into the 
value chains given by the attracted and retained multinationals; (III) embracing the 
export activity of local firms with the aim of supporting their internationalisation in 
key fields such as health, food, construction, creative industries, and digitalisation. 
Second, programmes have been initiated to foster transformation on many 
grounds, while prioritising SMEs’ capacity building. 
•	 Fostering learning: the so-called Industry 4.0 Template Factory flagship project 
offers a free program that provides key, hands-on experience and knowledge to 
micro, small, and medium-sized manufacturing businesses to become familiar 
with Industry 4.0 technologies and their applicability, with the aim of increasing 
their competitiveness by contributing to the transformation process.
•	 SMEs are a focal point: Larger companies are encouraged through the so-
called Supplier Development Programme to build new networks or develop 
their existing network with local suppliers in pursuing value-added products, 
adopting various technologies of Industry 4.0, and in enhancing their human 
capital. The Modern Business Programme puts more emphasis on the Digital 
Economy by targeting the digitalisation of entrepreneurship and the development 
of higher-level digital skills in the case of SMEs. In this way, the demand-pull 
force can be strengthened for the diffusion of Industry 4.0. 
•	 Candidates of high-growth enterprises to be supported: another equally 
important and promising programme is the HGC Academy, concentrating 
exclusively on manufacturing firms showing high-growth potential (HGCs 
as high-growth companies in terms of job creation and productivity).13 The 
HGC Academy offers a range of services (seeking international best practices, 
organising workshops across Hungary for firms motivated and competent 
13 The criteria for involving manufacturing companies are: a minimum of EUR 300,000 annual 
turnover; employment of over 10 persons; operation in convergence regions; domestic owner-
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enough to take part in the project14, mentoring, practical trainings, and 
education for the 40 selected companies), and its uniqueness also comes from 
the fact that it considers a so-called Prototyping Innovation Centre for selected 
firms. The Centre will be equipped with all the necessary Industry 4.0-related 
technologies and nontechnological solutions to be used for prototyping. Thus, 
it differs from other well-known concepts (e.g. technology transfer offices, 
innovation (and business) incubators, clusters, innovation/technology parks, 
and various innovation agencies), since it seeks to help manufacturing firms 
in real development at the technological level. It will not merely serve as a 
model factory but as a place where prospective Industry 4.0-based production 
and economic processes can be modelled and tested, and where innovative 
products can be incorporated into the production processes.
CONCLUSION
In response to our first question, whether optimism about the instant productivity-boosting character of Industry 4.0 and digital transformation is justified, we can conclude that optimism is unfounded, since there are 
headwinds in front of digitalisation and Industry 4.0 when it comes to its 
productivity effect (uncertainty over security, policies with a perverse effect, 
anti-inclusive features, institutional headwind). And once the headwinds are 
left unaddressed by economic governance, uncertainty over the sustainable 
evolvement of Industry 4.0 and digital transformation is on the rise. Our second 
question referred to how Hungary is progressing in terms of digitalisation and 
Industry 4.0, as well as whether there are any potential pitfalls. We can conclude 
that even though there are pitfalls, digital transformation and the unfolding 
Industry 4.0 cannot be reversed, and governance has made certain progress. 
In addition, by building both on the documented complexity of Industry 4.0 
and  the case of Hungary, the following basic principles might be conducive to 
economic governance acting as an effective ‘analogue-to-digital-converter’.
Cautiousness Comes First
Beyond the big questionmark over the expected spectacular productivity-boosting character of Industry 4.0, the ongoing digital transformation and the evolvement of Industry 4.0 challenges the trust infrastructure of a 
country (i.e. cyber-security concerns coupled with the increasing difficulty of maintaining 
employment levels erode state revenues, which endanger the sustainability of the 
14 Based on 153 companies employing more than 10,000 workers in Hungary. 60% of those is 
with less than 20% export in their operation, 9% have exports above 80%. Only 8% of these 
companies are familiar with digitalisation, and only 2% have experience in Big Data analytics.
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public finances of the welfare state). If one also considers that for a long time, 
economics has believed that growing inequality is the price of growth, now we 
better understand that there is no sustainable growth without a better-balanced 
society. As a corollary, cautiousness is in order in cherishing a trust-enhancing 
inclusive and export-driven development path (i.e. complex trainings about 
state-of-the-art cyber-security, supporting non-formal education for retraining, 
and acquiring non-cognitive skills in the case of displaced workers, initiating 
specific regulation for prioritising mainly machine-to-human development via 
support programmes for domestic companies, and providing incentives for 
foreign firms preferring this direction). 
Pioneering Game-changing Investment Promotion
Unfortunately, there are no perceivable and convincing efforts from the side of international organisations or national policymakers to pursue changing patterns in investment activity or investment promotion in light of a 
transformative Industry 4.0 and pervasive digitalisation; however, there are at least 
three profound implications. First, during this transformation, the importance of 
labour costs, a central issue in the case of international investment activity, has 
been declining and call for a renewal of policy tools in attracting investments, 
especially in countries facing labour shortages. To this end, policymakers 
should focus more on cultivating intangible investment (computer-related, 
innovative properties, company competencies)15. Hence, the pattern of industry 
concentration can be changed in coping with digital transformation. Second, 
an incentive regime (e.g. grants, tax incentives, etc.) geared towards attracting 
and retaining foreign direct investors should be refined in supporting digital 
transformation in general (i.e. better harnessing multinationals’ contribution to 
the digital transformation in Hungary by focusing on FDI upgrading). Third, since 
3D printing affects trade negatively and shortens supply chains, Hungary has 
the opportunity to pioneer attracting investments that make the economy green 
(i.e. investment promotion in sizeable and heavy products closer to the final 
consumers, thus avoiding high transport costs and emission).
Cultivating Medium-sized, Digitally Active, Export-ready Firms
There are at least three, partly interlinked, reasons behind the importance of supporting this process. (I) Old and/or smaller firms are less likely to have a digitally active operation. (II) There is a growing inequality among 
companies based on their size, due to the decoupling between the financial sector 
15 If intangible investment is a good predictor of changing industry concentration, that concentra-
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and the real economy. Namely the financial sector has become a self-propelling 
financial parasite of the real economy, mainly preferring low risktakers with 
a high net value, whereby larger companies dominate and cannot easily 
be contested (i.e. the share of young, high-growth companies has been 
decreasing). Curbing this phenomenon requires more intense competition, 
policies should therefore target companies with high-growth potential. (III) 
Empirics suggest that only a limited number of high-growth firms act as 
an inclusiveness-enhancing mechanism, i.e. creating most of the new jobs. 
Hungarian companies need to be supported to become larger through up-
scaling, to be ready to go further with the help of  multinationals. In other 
words, multinationals cannot be ignored simply because their critical mass 
guarantees a pull mechanism for smaller domestic companies, which can 
then contribute to upscaling Industry 4.0 technologies. In doing so, policy 
must concentrate more on firms that are not hiring, despite having high 
profits, while offering a range of services for firms pursuing export activity (e.g. 
identifying and arranging distributors, counselling, facilitating participation at 
trade fairs, etc.). In this way, the local absorptive capacity of Hungary can be 
facilitated to upgrade FDI structure as well.
Beside economic governance, economics shall also keep abreast of the 
challenges of our time. Economics must become a more interdisciplinary, 
complexity-oriented subject, in order to draw a more realistic picture for 
policymakers about what is really going on in the socio-economic innovation 
ecosystem. Till then, the wider public must be aware of the limitations of 
any kind of economic policy in achieving multiple and complex objectives 
(stimulating, for instance, investments in Industry 4.0 and/or digital 
transformation, as well as the internationalisation of domestic companies). 
Still, this is the way toward enhancing the quality of governance, which can 
definitely be an important constituent of any kind of boosterjet engine of 
productivity.
